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Discrete Transfinite Computation
P. D. Welch
School of Mathematics, University of Bristol, England.
Abstract
We describe various computational models based initially, but not exclu-
sively, on that of the Turing machine, that are generalized to allow for trans-
finitely many computational steps. Variants of such machines are considered
that have longer tapes than the standard model, or that work on ordinals rather
than numbers. We outline the connections between such models and the older
theories of recursion in higher types, generalized recursion theory, and recursion
on ordinals such as α-recursion. We conclude that, in particular, polynomial
time computation on ω-strings is well modelled by several convergent concep-
tions.
1 Introduction
There has been a resurgence of interest in models of infinitary computation
in the last decade. I say resurgence because there has been for 50 years or
more models of computation that deal with sets of integers, or objects of even
higher type, in generalized recursion theory. Such a theory was initiated by
Kleene’s generalization of his equational calculus for ordinary recursion theory
[16]-[19]. Whilst that was indeed a generalized recursion theory some commen-
tators remarked that it was possible to view, for example, what came to be
called Kleene recursion, as having a machine-like model. The difference here
was that the machine would have a countable memory, a countable tape or
tapes, but an ability to manipulate that countable memory in finite time, or
equivalently in one step. Thus a query about a set of integers r say, say coded
as an element of Cantor space, as to whether r was an element of an oracle
set A ⊆ 2N, could be considered a single computational operation. Moreover r
could be moved from a tape to a storage or otherwise manipulated or altered
in infinitely many places at once by one step of some procedure. This is what
Addison and Spector called the “ℵ0-mind” (see[30], p.405; further Kreisel spoke
of a generalized Church’s thesis). We thus had essentially a generalization of
the original Turing machine model. It should be noted however (in contradis-
tinction to the transfinite models of more recent years) that the computations
would all be represented by wellfounded computation trees when convergent,
and would otherwise be deemed non-convergent: an infinitely long linear se-
quence of computations represents failure. By declaring that countably many
operations on a set of integers could be done in “finite time” or all at once and
so count as one step, one simply sidesteps the difficulty of thinking of infinitely
many steps of a successful computation that is yet to be continued.
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Thus in the past mathematicians have been more inclined to consider well-
founded computation but applied to infinite objects, rather than considering
transfinite computations containing paths of transfinite order type. Examples
of the former: Kleene recursion as HYP-recursion, or the Blum-Shub-Smale
(BSS, [3]) machines acting with real inputs (or indeed other mathematical ob-
jects taken from a ring with suitable functions). One could almost say that a
hallmark of the generalizations of recursion theory to “higher”, or “generalized”
recursion theory has been that it has considered only wellfounded computation
albeit with infinitary objects of higher types. Sacks’s E-recursion [32] again
considers essentially the same paradigm of building up functions applied now
to sets in general: a non-convergent computation is exemplified by an infinite
path in a computation tree, thus rendering the tree ill-founded.
However what if we were nevertheless to think also of transfinite stages of
computation? There is a natural reaction to this: we feel that “computation” is
so tied up with our notions of finitary algorithm, indeed effective algorithm, that
it is too heterodox to consider transfinitely numbered steps as ‘computation.’
However why should this be? We are probably constrained to think of well
defined computations as shying away from anything that smells of a supertask :
the quandaries arising from Thomson’s Lamp [36] seem to have used up a
surprising lot of space and ink, for what is after all a simple definitional problem.
So supertasks have been banished from computational study.
However transfinite recursion or procedures are not at all alien, if not com-
mon in the everyday experience of the mathematician - there are after all, few
Π11-complete sets occuring as ‘natural’ mathematical objects - but the early
canonical example arises in the Cantor-Bendixson process. Here with a simple
decreasing chain of sets Xα ⊇ Xα+1 and intersections at limits: Xλ = ∩α<λXα,
one has a monotone process. Again the monotonicity phenomenon occurs cen-
trally in Kleene’s recursion theory of higher types, and we feel safer with a
monotone process than a non-monotone or discontinuous one.
Notwithstanding these qualms, the current chapter reviews the recent de-
scriptions of various machine models, including that of Turing’s original machine
itself, which can be given a defined behaviour at limit stages of time, enabling
them to compute through recursive ordinals and beyond. This behaviour, apart
from a few very elementary models, is signified by being non-monotonic, or
quasi-inductive.
We shall see that the various models link into several areas of modern logic:
besides recursion theory, set theory and the study of subsystems of second order
analysis play a role. Questions arise concerning the strengths of models that
operate at the level one type above that of the integers. This may be one
of ordinal types: how long a well ordered sequence of steps must a machine
undertake in order to deliver its output? Or it may be of possible output: if a
machine produces real numbers, which ordinals can be coded as output reals?
And so on and so forth.
1.1 Computation in the limit
To start at the beginning, steps towards transfinite considerations, or at least
that of considering what might have occurred on a tape at a finite stage, come
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immediately after considering the halting problem. The universal Turing ma-
chine can be designed to print out on an infinite output tape the code numbers
e of programmes Pe that will halt on input e: thus Pe(e)↓ . This Σ
0
1 set, as is
well known, is complete: any other Σ01 is (ordinary) Turing reducible to it.
Putnam [29] (and Gold [10]) went a step further.
Definition 1 ([29]) P is a trial and error predicate if and only if there is a
general recursive function f such that for every x1, . . . , xn:
P (x1, . . . , xn) ≡ limy→∞ f(x1, . . . , xn, y) = 1
¬P (x1, . . . , xn) ≡ limy→∞ f(x1, . . . , xn, y) = 0.
Running such a precedure on a Turing machine allows us to print out a ∆02
set A’s characteristic function on the output tape. In order to do this we are
forced to allow the machine to change its mind about n ∈ A and so repeatedly
substitute a 0 for a 1 or vice versa in the n’th cell of the output tape. However,
and this is the point, at most finitely many changes are to be made to that
particular cell’s value. It is this feature of not knowing at any finite given time
whether further alterations are to made, that makes this a transition from a
computable set to a non-computable one.
By a recursive division of the working area up into infinitely many infinite
pieces, one can arrange for the correct computation of all ?m ∈ A? to be done
on the one machine, and the correct values placed on the output tape.
However this is as far as one can go if one imposes the (very obvious, prac-
tical) rule that a cell’s value can only be altered finitely often. In order to get a
Σ02 set’s characteristic function written to the output tape, then in general one
cannot guarantee that a cell’s value is changed finitely often. Then immediately
one is in the hazardous arena of supertasks.
Nevertheless let us play the mathematicians’ game of generalizing for gener-
alization’s sake: let us by fiat declare a cell’s value that has switched infinitely
often 0 → 1 → 0 to be 0 at “time ω”. With this lim inf declaration one has,
mathematically at least, written down the Σ02-set on the output tape, again at
time ω.
Following this through we may contemplate continuing the computation at
times ω+1, ω+2, . . . , ω+ω . . .. Let 〈Ci(α) | i ∈ ω, α ∈ On〉 denote the contents
of cell Ci at time α in On. Let l(α) ∈ ω represent the cell number being observed
at time α. Similarly let q(α) denote the state of the machine/program at time
α. We merely need to specify (i) the read/write head position l(λ) and (ii) the
next state q(λ) for limit times λ (whilst l(α+ 1) and q(α+ 1) are obtained by
just following the usual rules for head movement and state change according
to the standard Turing transition table. (Note that the stock of programmes
has not changed, hence q(α) names one of the finitely many states of the usual
transition table; we are merely enlarging the possible behaviour.)
We intend that control of the program at a limit time λ, be placed at the
beginning of the outermost loop, or subroutine call, that was called unboundedly
often below λ. We thus set:
q(λ) = Liminfα<λ q(α).
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Input:
Scratch:
Output:
1
0
1
1
1
0
R/W
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Figure 1: A 3-tape Infinite Time Turing Machine
For limit λ we set Ci(λ) by:
Ci(λ) = k if ∃α < λ∀β < λ(α < β −→ Ci(β) = k) for k ∈ {0, 1};
= 0 otherwise.
The R/W head we place according to the above, also using a modified Lim-
inf rule:
l(λ) = Liminf∗〈l(α) | α < λ〉
This is not exactly the arrangement that Hamkins and Lewis specified in
[11] but it is inessentially different from it (HL specified a special limit state qλ
which the machine entered into automatically at limit stages, and the head was
always set back to the start of the tape. They specified (which we shall keep
here) that the machine be a three tape machine.
Input then can consist of a set of integers, suitably coded as an element of
2N on 〈C3i〉i and output likewise is such an element on 〈C3i+2〉i. Thus there
is little difference in a machine with an oracle Z ⊆ ω and one acting on input
Z coded onto the input tape. However we immediately see the possibility of
higher type computation: we may have some Z ⊆ 2N and then we add a query
state which asks if, say, the scratch tape 〈C3i+1〉i’s contents is or is not an
element of Z.
We have thus completely specified the ITTM’s behaviour. The scene is thus
set to ask what such machines are capable of. We defer discussion of this until
Section 2, whilst we outline the rest of this chapter here.
In one sense we have here a logician’s plaything: the Turing model has been
taken over and redesigned with a heavy-handed liminf rule of behaviour. This
liminf operation at limit stages is almost tantamount to an infinitary logical
rule, and most of the behaviour the machine exhibits is traceable to this rule.
But then of course it has to be, what else is there? Nevertheless this model
and those that have been studied subsequently have a number of connections or
aspects with other areas of logic. Firstly, with weak subsystems of analysis: it
is immediately clear that the behaviour of such machines is dependent on what
ordinals are available. A machine may now halt at some transfinite stage, or
may enter an infinitely repeating loop; but any theory that seeks to describe
such machines fully is a theory which implies the existence of sufficiently long
wellorderings along which such a machine can run (or be simulated as running).
We may thus ask “What (sub-) system of analysis is needed in which to discuss
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such a machine”? We shall see that machine variants may require longer
or shorter wellorderings, thus their theory can be discussed within different
subsystems.
Secondly, we can ask how the computable functions/sets of such a model
fit in with the earlier theories of generalized recursion theory of the 1960’s and
70’s. For example there is naturally associated with ITTM’s a so-called Spector
Class of sets. Such classes arise canonically in the generalized recursion theories
of that era through notions of definability.
Once one model has been defined it is very tempting to define variants. One
such is the Infinite Time Register Machine (ITRM’s - due to Koepke [23]) which
essentially does for Shepherdson-Sturgis machines what HL does for Turing
machines. Whilst at the finite level these two models are equal in power, their
infinitary versions differ considerably, the ITTM’s being much stronger. The
ITRM model is discussed in Section 3.
Just as for ordinary recursion on ω the TM model with a putative tape in
order type ω length is used, so when considering notions of α-recursion theory
for admissible ordinals α, it is possible to think of tapes also unfettered by
having finite initial segments: we may consider machines with tapes of order
type α and think of computing along α witb such machines. What is the relation
to this kind of computation and α-recursion theory?
One can contemplate even machines with an On-length tape. It turns
out (Koepke [22]) that this delivers a rather nice presentation of Go¨del’s con-
structible hierarchy. Finally discussed here is the notion of a Blum-Shub-Smale
machine ([3] acting transfinitely. With some continuity requirement imposed on
register contents for limit times, we see that functions such as exponentiation ex
which are not BSS computable, become naturally IBBS computable. Moreover
there is a nice equivalence between their decidable reals, and those produced by
the Safe Set Recursion (“SSR”) of Beckmann, Buss, and S. Friedman, which
can be thought of as generalizing to transfinite sets notions of polynomial time
computable functions on integers. Briefly put, a polynomial time algorithm
using ω as an input string, should be halting by some time ωn for some fi-
nite n. The IBBS computable reals are then identical to the SSR-computable
reals. The background second order theory needed to run IBBS machines lies
intermediate between WKL0 and ATR0.
The relation of ITTM’s to Kleene recursion is discussed in Section 2.
2 What ITTM’s can achieve.
Hamkins and Lewis in [11] explore at length the properties of ITTM’s: they
demonstrate the natural notion of a universal such machine, and hence an Snm-
theorem and the Recursion Theorems. A number of questions immediately
spring to mind:
Q. What is the halting set H = {e ∈ ω | Pe(0)↓}?
Here 〈Pe〉e enumerates the usual Turing machine programs/transition tables
(and we use Pe(x) ↓ y to denote that the e’th program on input x ∈ N or in
2N halts with output y. (If we are unconcerned about the y we omit reference
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to it.) An ITTM computation such as this can now halt in ω or more many
steps. But how long should we wait to see if Pe(0) ↓or not? This is behind the
following definitions.
Definition 2 (i) We write ‘Pe(n)↓αy’ if Pe(n)↓y in exactly α steps. We call
α clockable if ∃e∃n ∈ ω∃y Pe(n)↓
αy.
(ii) A real y ∈ 2N is writable if there are n, e ∈ ω with Pe(n)↓y; an ordinal
β is called writable, if β has a writable code y.
We may consider a triple s(α) = 〈l(α), q(α), 〈Ci(α)i〉〉 as a snapshot of a
machine at time α, which contains all the relevant information at that moment.
A computation is then given by a wellordered sequence of snapshots. There
are two possible outcomes: there is some time α at which the computation
halts , or else there must be some stage α0 at which the computation enters
the beginning of a loop, and from then on throughout the ordinals it must
iterate through this loop. It is easy either by elementary arguments or simply
by Lo¨wenheim-Skolem, to see that such an α0 must be a countable ordinal, and
moreover that the periodicity of the cycling loop is likewise countable.
The property of being a ‘well-ordered sequence of snapshots in the compu-
tation Pe(x)’ is Π
1
1 as a relation of e and x. Hence ‘Pe(x)↓y’ is ∆
1
2:
∃w(w codes a halting computation of Pe(x), with y written on the output
tape at the final stage) ⇐⇒
∀w(w codes a computation of Pe(x) that is either halting or performs a re-
peating infinite loop −→ w codes a halting computation with y on the output
tape.)
Likewise Pe(x) ↑ is also ∆12. By the above discussion then it is immediate
that the clockable and writable ordinals are all countable. Let λ =df sup{α | α is
writable}; let γ =df sup{α | α is clockable}. Hamkins-Lewis showed that λ ≤ γ.
Q2 Is λ = γ?
Definition 3 (i) x∇ = {e|Pe(x)↓} (The halting set on integers).
(ii) XH = {(e, y)|PXe (y)↓} (The halting set on reals relativised to X ⊆ 2
N).
This yields the halting sets, both for computations on integers and secondly
on reals where by the latter we include the instruction for the ITTM to query
whether the current scratch tape’s contents considered as a real, is in X .
Definition 4 (i) R(x) is an ITTM-semi-decidable predicate if there is an index
e so that:
∀x(R(x)↔ Pe(x)↓1)
(ii) A predicate R is ITTM-decidable if both R and ¬R are ITTM-semi-decidable.
Q3 What are the ITTM-(semi-)decidable sets of integers, or reals? What
is x∇?
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The last question seems somewhat impenetrable without a characterisation
of the halting behaviour of ITTM’s - and one version of that problem is Question
2. To analyse decidability one route might be through a version of Kleene’s
Normal Form Theorem in the context of ITTM’s. However there is an obvious
type difference: a successful halting computation of an ordinary Turing machine
in a finite amount of time can be coded as a finite sequence of finite ordinary-
TM-snapshots, and thus through the usual coding devices, by an integer. This
is essentially the heart of Kleene’s T -predicate argument. Thus for standard
TM’s Kleene demonstrated that given an index e we may effectively find an
index e′ so that for any n: Pe(n) ↓−→ Pe′ (n) ↓M where M ∈ N is a code for
the whole computation sequence of Pe(n).
However this is too simple here: Pe(0) ↓may halt at some transfinite time
β ≥ ω. Hence the halting computation is only codable by an infinite sequence
of infinite ITTM-snapshots S say, of some order type τ . In order for there to
be a chance of having another index e′ with Pe′(n) ↓ y where y codes such a
sequence S, one has to know at the very least that there is an e0 so that Pe0 (n)
halts with output a code for τ . In other words that τ be writable. Thus we
need an affirmative answer to Q2 at the very least.
Interestingly the key to answering halting behaviour is not to aim straight
for an analysis of halting per se, but at another phenomenon that is peculiarly
significant to ITTM’s. There can be computations Pe(x) that whilst they have
not formally halted, nevertheless from some point in time onwards, leave their
output tapes alone, and just churn around for ever perhaps doodling or making
entries on their scratch tape. The output has however stabilized . We formally
define this as follows:
Definition 5 (i) Suppose for the computation Pe(x) the machine does not halt
then we write Pe(x) ↑ ; if eventually the output tape does have a stable value
y ∈ 2N then we write: Pe(x)↑ y and we say that y is eventually x-writable.
(ii) R(x) is an eventually ITTM-semi-decidable predicate if there is an index
e so that:
∀x(R(x)↔ Pe(x)↑ 1)
(iii) A predicate R is eventually ITTM-decidable if both R and ¬R are eventu-
ally ITTM-semi-decidable.
This proliferation of notions is not gratuitous: it turns out that answeringQ2
on clockables vis a` vis writables, depends on successfully analysing stabilization
patterns of individual cells Ci during the course of the computation Pe(n). The
moral is that stabilization is anterior to halting. The following lemma illustrates
the point.
Theorem 1 (The λ, ζ,Σ-Theorem) (Welch cf. [38], [41]) (i) Any ITTM
computation Pe(x) which halts, does so by time λ
x, the latter being defined as
the supremum of the x-writable ordinals.
(ii) Any computation Pe(x) with eventually stable output tape, will stabilize
before the time ζx defined as the supremum of the eventually x-writable ordinals.
(iii) Moreover ζx is the least ordinal so that there exists Σx > ζx with the
property that
Lζx [x] ≺Σ2 LΣx [x];
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(iv) Then λx is also characterised as the least ordinal satisfying:
Lλx [x] ≺Σ1 Lζx [x].
If we unpack the contents here, answers to our questions are given by (iii)
and (iv). Let us take x = ∅ so that we may consider the unrelativised case.
Our machine-theoretic structure and operations are highly absolute and it is
clear that running the machine inside the constructible hierarchy of Lα’s yields
the same snapshot sequence as considering running the machine in V . If Pe(n) ↓
then this is a Σ1-statement (in the language of set theory). As halting is merely
a very special case of stabilization, then we have that
Pe(n) ↓↔ (Pe(n) ↓ )
Lζ ↔ (Pe(n) ↓ )
Lλ
(the latter because Lλ ≺Σ1 Lζ). Hence the computation must halt before
λ. Hence the answer to Q2 is affirmative: every halting time (of an integer
computation) is a writable ordinal. One quickly sees that a set of integers is
ITTM-decidable if and only if it is an element of Lλ. It is ITTM-semi-decidable
if and only if it is Σ1(Lλ).
Since the limit rules for ITTM’s are intrinsically of a Σ2-nature, with hind-
sight it is perhaps not surprising that this would feature in the (ζ,Σ) pair arising
as they do: after all the snapshot of the universal ITTM at time ζ is going to
be coded into the Σ2-Theory of this Lζ . The universality of the machine is
then apparent in the fact that by stage ζ it will have “constructed” all the
constructible sets in Lζ .
As a corollary one obtains then:
Theorem 2 (Normal Form Theorem)(Welch) (a) For any ITTM com-
putable function ϕe we can effectively find another ITTM computable function
ϕe′ so that on any input x from 2
N if ϕe(x) ↓ then ϕe′ (x) ↓ y ∈ 2N, where y
codes a wellordered computation sequence for ϕe(x).
(b) There is a universal predicate T1 which satisfies ∀e∀x:
Pe(x)↓ z ↔ ∃y ∈ 2
N[T1(e, x, y) ∧ Last(y) = z].
Moreover as a corollary (to Theorem 1):
Corollary 1 (i) x∇ ≡1 Σ1-Th(〈Lλx [x],∈, x〉) - the latter the Σ1-theory of the
structure.
(ii) Let x∞ =df {e | ∃yPe(x) ↑ y} be the set of x-stable indices, of those
program numbers whose output tapes eventually stabilize. Then
x∞ ≡1 Σ2-Th(〈Lζx [x],∈, x〉).
The conclusions are that the Σ1-Theory of Lλ is recursively isomorphic to
the ITTM-jump 0∇. One should compare this with Kleene’s O being recursively
isomorphic to the hyperjump, or again the Σ1-Theory of Lωck1 . The second part
of the Corollary gives the analogous results for the index set of the eventu-
ally stable programs: here we characterise 0∞ as the Σ2-Theory of Lζ . The
relativisations to inputs x are immediate.
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One should remark that extensions of Kleene’s O from the ? case to the
ITTM case are straightforward: we can define O+ by adding in to O those
indices of Turing programs that now halt at some transfinite time. After all, we
are keeping the programs the same for both classes of machines, so we can keep
the same formalism and definitions (literally) but just widen the class of what
we consider computations. Similarly we can expand O+ to O∞ by adding in
those indices of eventually stabilising programs. This is done in detail in [20].
We thus have:
O
Lωck1
≈
O+
Lλ
≈
O∞
Lζ
.
2.1 Comparisons with Kleene recursion
We have alluded to Kleene recursion in the introduction. His theory of recursion
in higher types ([16],[17],[18], [19]) was an equational calculus, a generalization
of that for the Go¨del-Herbrand generalized recursive functions. In this theory
numbers were objects of type 0, whilst a function f : Nm −→ N is an object
of type 1; and F : Nl × (2N)m −→ N one of type 2 etc. The e’th procedure
(whether thought of as the e’th program of the kind of machine as outlined
in the introduction, or else as e’th equation system in his calculus) then al-
lowed a computation with inputs ~n, ~x with oracle I to be presented in the form
{e}(~n, ~x, I). The oracle I was usually taken to include an oracle for existential
quantification E where, for x ∈ 2N:
0 if ∃nx(n) = 0
E(x) =
1 otherwise.
The reason for this was, although for any oracle I the class of relations
semi-decidable in I was closed under ∀N quantification, when semi-decidable
additionally in E it becomes closed under ∃N quantification. The Kleene semi-
decidable sets then would include the arithmetic sets in N × 2N (or further
products thereof). (Ensuring computations be relative to E also guarantees
that we have the Ordinal Comparison Theorem.)
The decidable relations turn out to be the hyperarithmetic ones, and the
semi-decidable are those Kleene-reducible to WO, the latter being a complete
Π11 set of reals. Thus:
Theorem 3 (Kleene) The hyperarithmetic relations R(~n, ~x) ⊆ Nk×(NN)l for
any k, l ∈ N, are precisely those computable in E.
The Π11 relations are precisely those semi-computable in E.
Then a reducibility ordering comes from:
Definition 6 Kleene reducibility: Let A,B ⊆ R; we say that A is Kleene-
semi-computable in B iff there is an index e and y ∈ R so that
∀x ∈ R(x ∈ A←→ {e}(x, y,B, E) ↓ 1)).
A is Kleene computable in B, written, A ≤K B, iff both A and its complement
are Kleene-semi-computable in B.
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The presence of the real y deserves some explanation. We want to think
of the degree structure as being between sets of reals; the set y throws in a
countable amount of information to the computation, and we are thus thinking
of two sets of reals A =K B as being of the same complexity up to this countable
amount of data. It implies that each Kleene degree contains continuum many
sets of reals, but moreover is closed under continuous pre-images - it thus forms
also a union of Wadge degrees .
We thus shall have that besides ∅,R the bottommost Kleene degree contains
precisely all the Borel sets, whilst the degree of WO contains all co-analytic sets.
As one sees the notion is very tied up with hyperarithmeticity.
If we have a transitive reducibility notion≤ on sets of integers x say, together
with a concomitant jump operator x −→ x′ then an ordinal assignment x −→
τx ∈ On is said to be a Spector criterion if we have:
x ≤ y −→ (x′ ≤ y ←→ τx < τy). (∗)
As an example if we take here hyperdegree x ≤h y (abbreviating “x is hyper-
arithmetic in y”) and the hyperjump operation, x −→ xh where xh is a complete
Π1,x1 set of integers, then the assignment x −→ ω
x
1 ck (where the latter is the
least ordinal not (ordinary) Turing recursive in x) satisfies the Spector Criterion
(∗) above. For sets of reals B we may extend this notation and let ωB,x1 ck be
the ordinal height α of the least model of KP set theory (so the least admissible
set) of the form Lα[x,B] |= KP.
With this we may express A ≤K B as follows:
Lemma 1 A ≤K B iff there are Σ1-formulae in L∈,X˙ ϕ1(X˙, v0, v1), ϕ2(X˙, v0, v1),
and there is y ∈ R, so that
∀x ∈ R(x ∈ A ⇐⇒ L
ω
B,y,x
1
[B, y, x] |= ϕ1[B, y, x]
⇐⇒ L
ω
B,y,x
1
[B, y, x] |= ¬ϕ2[B, y, x]).
Back to ITTM-semidecidability:
The notion of semi-decidability comes in two forms.
Definition 7 (i) A set of integers x is semi-decidable in a set y if and only if:
∃e∀n ∈ x [P ye (n)↓ 1←→ n ∈ x ]
(ii) A set of integers x is decidable in a set y if and only if both x and its com-
plement is semi-decidable in y. We write x ≤∞ y for the reducibility ordering.
(iii) A set of integers x is eventually-(semi)-decidable in a set y if and only
if the above holds with ↑ replacing ↓. For this reducibility ordering we write
x ≤∞ y.
We then get the analogue of the Spector criterion using x∇ as the jump
operator:
Lemma 2 (i) The assignment x֌ λx satisfies the Spector Criterion:
x ≤∞ y −→ (x∇ ≤∞ y ↔ λx < λy).
(ii) Similarly for the assignment x֌ ζx :
x ≤∞ y −→ (x∞ ≤∞ y ↔ ζx < ζy)
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One can treat the above as confirmation that the ITTM degrees and jump
operation are more akin to hyperarithmetic degrees and the hyperjump, than to
the (standard) Turing degrees and Turing jump. Indeed they are intermediate
between hyperdergees and ∆12-degrees.
To see this, we define a notion of degree using definability and Turing-
invariant functions on reals (by the latter we mean a function f : R −→ ω1
such that x ≤T y −→ f(x) ≤ f(y)). Now assume that f is Σ1-definable over
(HC,∈) without parameters, by a formula in L∈˙.
Definition 8 Let f be as described; let Φ be a class of formulae of L∈˙. Then
Γ = Γf,Φ is the pointclass of sets of reals A so that A ∈ Γ if and only if there
is ϕ ∈ Φ with:
∀x ∈ R(x ∈ A↔ Lf(x)[x] |= ϕ[x]).
With the function f(x) = ωx1 ck and Φ as the class of Σ1-formulae we have
that Γf,Φ coincides with the Π
1
1-sets of reals (by the Spector-Gandy Theorem).
Replacing f with the function g(x) = λx then yields the (lightface) ITTM-semi-
decidable sets. Lemma 1 is then the relativisation of Kleene recursion which
yields the relation A ≤K B.
We now make the obvious definition:
Definition 9 A set of reals A is semi-decidable in a set of reals B if and only
if:
∃e∀x ∈ 2N
[
PBe (x) ↓ 1↔ x ∈ A
]
(ii) A set of reals A is decidable in a set of reals B if and only if both A and
its complement is semi-decidable in B.
(iii) If in the above we replace ↓ everywhere by ↑ then we obtain the notion in (i)
of A is eventually decidable in B and in (ii) of A is eventually semi-decidable
in B.
Then the following reducibility generalizes that of Kleene recursion.
Definition 10
(i) A ≤∞B iff for some e ∈ ω, for some y ∈ 2N : A is decidable in (y,B).
(ii) A ≤∞B iff for some e ∈ ω, for some y ∈ 2N : A is eventually decidable in
(y,B).
Again a real parameter has been included here in order to have degrees closed
under continuous pre-images. We should expect that these reducibilities are
dependent on the ambient set theory, just as they are for Kleene degrees: under
V = L there are many incomparable degrees below that of the complete semi-
decidable degree, and under sufficient determinacy there will be no intermediate
degrees between the latter and 0, and overall the degrees will be wellordered.
Now we get the promised analogy lifting Lemma 1, again generalizing in two
ways depending on the reducibility.
Lemma 3
(i) A ≤∞B iff there are Σ1-formulae in L∈,X˙ ϕ1(X˙, v0, v1), ϕ2(X˙, v0, v1), and
y ∈ R, so that
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∀x ∈ R(x ∈ A ⇐⇒ LζB,y,x [B, y, x] |= ϕ1[B, y, x]
⇐⇒ LζB,y,x [B, y, x] |= ¬ϕ2[B, y, x]).
(ii) A ≤∞B iff there are Σ2-formulae in L∈,X˙ ϕ1(X˙, v0, v1), ϕ2(X˙, v0, v1), and
y ∈ R, so that
∀x ∈ R(x ∈ A ⇐⇒ LζB,y,x [B, y, x] |= ϕ1[B, y, x]
⇐⇒ LζB,y,x [B, y, x] |= ¬ϕ2[B, y, x]).
We have not formally defined all the terms here: λB,y,x is the supremum
of the ordinals written by Turing programs acting transfinitely with oracles
for B, y. The ordinal ζB,y,x is the least that is not ITTM-(B, x, y)-eventually-
semi-decidable. There is a corresponding λ-ζ-Σ-theorem and thus we have also
that this ζ is least such that LζB,y,x [B, y, x] has a proper Σ2-elementary end-
extension in the L[B, y, x] hierarchy.
2.2 Degree theory and complexity of ITTM computations
Corollary 1 shows that the ITTM-jump of a set of integers x is essentially a
mastercode, or a Σ1-truth set if you will, namely that of Lλx [x]. The analogy
here then is with Ox, the hyperjump of x, which is a complete Π1,x1 set of
integers, as being also recursively isomorphic to Σ1-(Th(Lωx1,ck [x]) . This again
indicates that the degree analogy here should be pursued with hyperdegrees
rather than Turing degrees. It is possible to iterate the jump hierachy through
the =∞ - degrees, and one finds that, inside L, the first ζ-iterations form a
linearly ordered hierachy with least upper bounds at limit stages. We emphasise
this as being inside L since one can show that there is no least upper upper
bound to {0∇n | n < ω}, but rather continuum many minimal upper bounds.
(see [37]). We don’t itemize these results here but refer the reader instead to
[38].
A more general but basic open question is:
Q If D = {dn : n < ω} is a countable set of =∞-degrees, does D have a
minimal upper bound?
The background to this question is varied: for hyperdegrees this is also
an open question. Under Projective Determinacy a positive answer is known
for ∆12n-degrees, but for ∆
1
2n+1-degrees this is open, even under PD. Minimal
infinite time∞-degrees can be shown to exist by similar methods, using perfect
set forcing, to those of Sacks for minimal hyperdegrees (again see [37]).
One can also ask at this point about the nature of Post’s problem for semi-
decidable sets of integers. By the hyperdegree analogy one does not expect
there to be incomparable such sets below 0∇ and indeed this turns out to be
the case ([12]).
2.3 Truth and arithmetical quasi-inductive sets
It is possible to relate ITTM’s closely to an earlier notion due to Burgess [4] of
arithmetical quasi-inductive definitions. We first make a general definition:
Definition 11 Let Φ : P(N) → P(N) be a Γ-operator, that is “n ∈ Φ(X)” is
a Γ-relation. We define the Γ-quasi-inductive operator using iterates of Φ as:
Φ0(X) = X ; Φα+1(X) = Φ(Φα(X));
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Φλ(X) = lim infα→λ Φα(X) =df ∪α<λ ∩λ>β>α Φβ(X).
We set the stability set to be ΦOn(X).
By the nature of the lim inf operation at limits, it is easy to see that the
operation of an ITTM is an example of a recursive quasi-inductive operator
on N. Recall that a set of integers B say is inductive if it is (1-1) reducible
to the least fixed point of a monotone Π11-operator. Burgess defined such a B
to be arithmetically quasi-inductive if it was (1-1) reducible to the stability set
ΦOn(∅).
In order to prove that an AQI halts, or reaches a stability point, one needs
to know that one has sufficiently long wellorderings, and a certain amount of
second order number theory is needed to prove that such ordinals exist. For
the case of the ITTM’s we know which ordinals we need: Σx for a compu-
tation involving integers and the input real x. We then adopt this idea of a
‘repeat pair’ of ordinals for a quasi-inductive operator Φ: the least pair (ζ,Σ) =
(ζ(Φ, x),Σ(Φ, x)) with Φζ(x) = ΦΣ(x) = ΦOn(x).
Definition 12 AQI is the sentence: “For every arithmetic operator Φ, for ev-
ery x ⊆ N, there is a wellordering W with a repeat pair (ζ(Φ, x),Σ(Φ, x)) in
Field(W )”. If an arithmetic operator Φ acting on x has a repeat pair, we say
that Φ converges (with input x).
We may simulate an AQI with starting set x ⊆ N as an ITTM with input
x. Since we know how long such a machine takes to halt or loop, this gives
the length of ordering needed to determine the extent of the AQI. Given the
characterisation from the (relativized) λ-ζ-Σ-Theorem one arrives at the fact
that
Theorem 4 The theories Π1
3
-CA0, ∆
1
3
-CA0+AQI, and ∆
1
3
-CA0 are in strictly
descending order of strength, meaning that each theory proves the existence of
a β-model of the next.
What was engaging Burgess was an analysis of a theory of truth due to
Herzberger [15]. The latter had defined a Revision Sequence which was essen-
tially a quasi-inductive operator, just a bit beyond the arithmetic as follows.
H0 = ∅:
Hα+1 = {pσq : 〈N,+,×, · · · , Hα〉 |= σ} ; with Hα interpreting T ;
Hλ = ∪α<λ ∩λ>β>α Hβ.
Burgess then defined the AQI sets as above and calculated that the ordinals
(ζ,Σ) formed exactly the repeat pair needed for AQI’s or for the Herzberger
revision sequence. This was much earlier than the invention of ITTM’s and was
unknown to workers in the latter area around 2000, until Benedikt Lo¨we pointed
out ([27]) the similarity between the Herzberger revision sequence formalism
and that of the machines. It can be easily seen that any Herzberger sequence
with starting distribution of truth values x say, can be mimicked on an ITTM
with input x. Thus this is one way of seeing that Herzberger sequences must
have a stability pair lexicographically no later than (ζ,Σ). Burgess had shown
that H-sequences then loop at no earlier pair of points. More recently Field
[7] has used a revision theoretic definition with a Π11-quasi-inductive operator
to define a variant theory of truth. For all three formalisms, Fields, Burgess’s
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AQI, and ITTM’s, although differing considerably in theory, the operators are
all essentially equivalent as is shown in [40], since they produce recursively
isomorphic stable sets. The moral to be drawn from this is that in essence the
strength of the liminf rule is at play here, and seems to swamp all else.
3 Variant ITTM models
Several questions readily occur once one has formulated the ITTM model. Were
any features chosen crucial to the resulting class of computable functions? Do
variant machines produce different classes? Is it necessary to have three tapes in
the machine? The answer for the latter question is both yes and no. First the
affirmative part: it was shown in [14] the class of functions f : N −→ N remains
the same if 3 tapes are replaced by 1, but not the class of functions f : 2N −→
2N. The difficulty is somewhat arcane: one may simulate a 3-tape machine
on a 1-tape machine, but to finally produce the output on the single tape and
halt, some device is needed to tell the machine when to finish compacting the
result down on the single tape, and they show that this cannot be coded on a
1-tape machine. On the other hand [39] shows that if one adopts an alphabet
of three symbols this can be done and the class of functions f : 2N −→ 2N is
then the same. One may also consider a B for ‘Blank’ as the third symbol, and
change the liminf rule so that if cell Ci has varied cofinally in a limit ordinal
λ, then Ci(λ) is set to be blank (thus nodding towards ambiguity of the cell
value). With this alphabet and liminf rule a 1-tape machine computes the same
classes as a 3-tape machine, and these are both the same as computed by the
original ITTM.
What of the liminf rule itself? We have just mentioned a variant in the last
paragraph. Our original liminf rule is essentially of a Σ2 nature: a value of 1 is
in a cell Ci(µ) at limit time µ if there is an α < µ such that for all β ∈ (α, β)
Ci(β) = 1. Running a machine inside Lµ one sees that the snapshot s(µ)
is a predicate that is Σ2-definable over Lµ. It was observed in [38] that the
liminf rule is complete for all other rules Σ2-definable over limit levels Lµ in
that for any other such rule the stability set obtained for the universal machine
(on 0 input) with such a rule is (1-1) Σ2-definable over Lζ and thus is (1-1)
in the Σ2-truth set for Lζ . However the latter is recursively isomorphic to the
stability set for the universal ITTM by Corollary 1 and hence the standard
stability set subsumes that of another machine with a different Σ2-rule. Given
the Σ2 nature of the limit rule, with hindsight one sees that it is obvious that
with (ζ′,Σ′) defined to be the lexicographically least pair with Lζ′ ≺Σ2 LΣ′ ,
then we must have that the universal ITTM enters a loop at ζ′. That it cannot
enter earlier of course is the λ-ζ-Σ-Theorem, but a vivid way to see that this
is the case is afforded by the construction in [9] which demonstrated that there
was a non-halting ITTM program producing on its output tape continually sets
of integers that coded levels Lα of the constructible hierarchy for ever larger α
below Σ; at stage Σ it would perforce produce the code for Lζ and then forever
cycle round this loop producing codes for levels α ∈ [ζ,Σ).
More complex rules lead to more complex machines. These were dubbed
‘hypermachines’ in [8], where a machine was defined with a Σ3-limit rule, and
this was shown to be able to compute codes for Lα for α < Σ(3), where now
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ζ(3) < Σ(3) was the lexicographically least pair with Lζ(3) ≺Σ3 LΣ(3). The
stability set was now that from the snapshot at stage ζ(3) and was (1-1) to the
Σ3-truth set for this level of L. Inductively then one defines Σ4,Σ5, . . . ,Σn, . . .
limit rules with the analogous properties. I think it has to be said though that
the definitions become increasingly complex and even for n = 3, mirror more
the structure of L in these regions with its own ‘stable ordinals’ rather than
anything machine-inspired. With these constructions one can then ‘compute’
any real that is in Lτ where τ = supn ζ(n).
3.1 Longer tapes
generalizations of the ITTM machine are possible in different directions. One
can consider machines with tapes not of cells of order type ω but of longer
types. Some modifications are needed: what do we do if the program asks the
R/W head to move one step leftwards when hovering over a cell Cλ for λ a limit
ordinal? There are some inessentially different choices to be made which we
do not catalogue here, but assume some fixed choices have been made.
We consider first the extreme possibility that the tape is of length On, that is
of the class of all ordinals. We now have the possibility that arbitrary sets may
be computed by such machines. Independently Dawson and Koepke came up
with this concept. There are some caveats: how do we know that we can ‘code’
sets by transfinite strings of 0, 1’s at all? Dawson ([6]) formulated an Axiom
of Computability that said every set could appear coded on the output tape of
such a machine at some stage whilst it was running; thus for any set z there
would be a program number e with Pe (not necessarily halting) with a code for
z appearing on its output tape. He then argued that the class of such sets is a
model of ZFC, and by studying the two dimensional grid of snapshots produced
a Lo¨wenheim-Skolem type argument to justify that the Axiom of Computability
implied the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis. That the class of computable
sets satisfied AC falls out of the assumption that sets can be coded by strings and
such can be ordered. Since this machine’s operations are again very absolute,
it may be run inside L, thus demonstrating that ‘computable sets’ are nothing
other than the constructible sets. Koepke in [21] and later with Koerwien in
[22] considered instead halting computations starting with an On-length tape
marked with finitely many 1’s in certain ordinal positions (n, ξ1, . . . , ξn), and
asked for a computation as to whether (ϕn(ξ1, . . . ξn−1))
Lξn was true. Thus the
machine was capable of computing a truth predicate for L. This leads to:
Theorem 5 (Koepke [21]) A set x ⊆ On is On-ITTM-computable from a finite
set of ordinal parameters if and only if it is a member of the constructible
hierarchy.
One might well ask whether the computational approach to L might lead
to some new proofs, or at least new information, on some of the deeper fine
structural and combinatorial properties of L. However this hope turned out
to be seemingly thwarted by the Σ2-nature of the limit rule. Fine structural
arguments are very sensitive to definability issues, and in constructions such as
that for Jensen’s  principle, say, we need to know when or how ordinals are
singularised for any n including n = 1 and the limit rule works against this.
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Moreover alternatives such as the Silver Machine model which was specifically
designed to by-pass Jensen’s fine structural analysis of L, make heavy use of
a Finiteness Property that everything appearing at a successor stage can be
defined from the previous stages and a finite set of parameters; just does not
seem to work for On-ITTM’s.
However this does bring to the fore the question of shortening the tapes to
some admissible ordinal length α > ω say, and asking what are the relations
between α-ITTM’s and the α-recursion theory developed in the late 1960’s and
early 70’s. The definitions of that theory included that a set A ⊆ α which
is Σ1(Lα) was called α-recursively enumerable (α-r.e.). It was α-recursive if
both it and its complement is α-r.e. and thus is ∆1(Lα). A notion of relative
α-recursion was defined but then noticed to be intransitive; a stronger notion
was defined and denoted by A ≤α B.
Koepke and Seyfferth in [24] define A is computable in B to mean that
the characteristic function of A can be computed by a machine in α many
stages from an oracle for B. This is exactly the relation that A ∈ ∆1(Lα[B]).
This has the advantage that the notion of α-computability and the associ-
ated α-computable enumerability (α-c.e.) tie up exactly with the notions of
α-recursiveness and α-r.e. They then reprove the Sacks-Simpson theorem for
solving Post’s problem: namely that there can be two α-c.e. sets neither of
which are mutually computable in their sense from the other.
However the relation “is computable in” again suffers from being an intran-
sitive one. Dawson defines the notion of α-sequential computation that requires
the output to the α-length tape be written in sequence without revisions. This
gives him a transitive notion of relative computability: a set is α-computable if
and only if it is α-recursive, and it is α-computably enumerable if and only if
it is both α-r.e. and regular. Since Sacks had shown ([31]) that any α-degree
of α.-r.e. sets contains a regular set, he then has that the structure of the α-
degrees of the α-r.e. sets in the classical, former, sense, is isomorphic to that
of the α-degrees of the α-c.e. sets. This implies that theorems of classical α-
recursion theory about α-r.e. sets whose proofs rely on, or use regular α-r.e.
sets will carry over to his theory. This includes the Sacks-Simpson result al-
luded to. The Shore Splitting Theorem ([34]) which states that any regular
α-r.e. set A may be split into two disjoint α-r.e. sets B0, B1 with A α Bi, is
less amenable to this kind of argument but with some work the Shore Density
theorem ([35]) that between any two α-r.e. sets A <α B there lies a third α-r.e.
C: A <α C <α B can be achieved. As Sacks states in his book, the latter proof
seems more bound up with the finer structure of the constructible sets than the
other α-recursion theory proofs. Dawson generalizes this by lifting his notion
of α-computation to that of a B-α-computation where now B =df 〈JBα ,∈,B〉 is
an admissible, acceptable, and sound structure for a B ⊆ α. These assumptions
make JBα sufficiently L-like to rework the Shore argument to obtain:
Theorem 6 (Dawson - The α-c.e. Density Theorem) Let B be as above. Let
A,B be two B-α-c.e. sets, with A <
B,α B. Then there is C also B-α-c.e, with
A <
B,α C <B,α B.
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4 Other Transfinite Machines
Once the step has been taken to investigate ITTM’s, one starts looking at other
machine models and sending them into the transfinite. We look here at Infinite
Time Register Machines (ITRM’s) both with integer and ordinal registers, and
lastly comment on Infinite Time Blum-Shub-Smale Machines (IBSSM’s).
4.1 Infinite time register machines (ITRM’s)
A (standard) register machine as devised by Shepherdson and Sturgis [33], or
Minsky [28], consists of finite number of natural number registers Ri for i < N ,
running under a program consisting of a finite list of instructions ~I = I0, . . . , Iq.
The latter consist of zeroising, transferring of register contents one to another,
or conditional jump to an instruction number in the program, when comparing
two registers. At time α we shall list the N -vector of register contents as ~R(α).
The next instruction the machine is about to perform we shall denote by I(α).
We adopt a liminf rule again. Thus the next instruction to be performed at
limit stage λ, is I(λ) =df lim infα→λ I(α). As discussed before for ITTM’s,
this can be seen to place control at the beginning of the outermost loop, or
subroutine, entered cofinally often before stage λ. We shall use a lim inf∗ rule
for register contents: if a register’s contents edges up to infinity at time λ it is
reset to 0:
Ri(λ) =df lim inf
α→λ
Ri(α) if this is finite; otherwise we set Ri(λ) = 0.
Athough perhaps not apparent at this point, it is this ‘resetting to zero’
that gives the ITRM its surprising strength: specifying that the machine, or
program, crash with no output if a register becomes unbounded results in a
substantially smaller class of computable functions. A function F : NN → N
is then ITRM-computable if there is an ITRM program P with P (~k) ↓F (~k) for
every ~k ∈ NN . In order to accommodate computation from a set of integers
Z ⊆ N say, we add an oracle query instruction ?k ∈ Z? and receive as 0/1 the
answer to a register as a result.
These machines were defined by Koepke and investigated by him and co-
workers in [5], [23]. A clockable ordinal has the same meaning here as for
ITTM’s, except that here these ordinals for man initial segment of On. Defining
a computable ordinal as one which has real code whose characteristic function
is ITRM-computable, they show that the clockables ordinals coincide with the
computable ordinals. To analyse what they are capable of, first note as a
crude upper bound that they could be easily simulated on an ITTM. However
ITRM’s can detect whether an oracle set Z ⊆ N codes a wellfounded relation:
a backtracking algorithm that searches for leftmost paths can be programmed.
Thus Π11-sets are ITRM-decidable.
It also turns out that, in contradistinction to the finite case, the strength
of the infinite version of register machines diverges from that of the Turing
machine, but moreover there is no universal ITRM. We outline the arguments
for this.
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Definition 13 (N -register halting set)
HN =df {〈e, r0, . . . , rN−1〉 | Pe(r0, . . . , rN−1) ↓}.
(There is an obvious generalization HZn for machines with oracle Z.)
Koepke and Miller show that if there is some instruction I ′ and register
contents vector
−→
Ri such that the snapshot (I
′,
−→
Ri) reoccurs in the course of
computation at least ωω times in order type, then the computation is in a loop
and will go on for ever.
Theorem 7 (Koepke-Miller [23]) For any N the N -halting problem: ‘〈e, ~r〉 ∈
HN ’ is decidable by an ITRM. Similarly for any oracle Z, the (N,Z)-halting
problem ‘〈e, ~r〉 ∈ HZN ’ is decidable by a Z-ITRM with an oracle for Z.
The number of registers has to be increased to calculateHN for increasingN .
The corollary to this is that there can be no one single universal ITRM. We can
get an exact description of the strength of ITRM’s by assessing bounds on the
ordinals needed to see that a machine either halts or is looping. It is discussed
in [26] and shown there that if one has an ITRM with a single register then
it has either halted or is in an infinite loop by the second admissible ordinal
ωck2 . One cannot replace this with ω1 = ω
ck
1 : if Liminfβ→ω1 R0(β) = p <
ω then a Π2-reflection argument shows that the same instruction number is
used, and the value in the register is this p, on a set of ordinals closed and
unbounded in ω1. By the Koepke-Miller criterion mentioned above this would
indeed mean that the computation was looping. However it can be the case that
Liminfβ→ω1 R0(β) = ω and then this would have to be reset to 0: R0(ω1) = 0.
Then again Liminfβ→ω1+ω1 R0(β) may also be ω, but the instruction number
could now differ. However by ωck2 the criterion will have already applied and
the computation if still running will be looping. One then shows by induction
that each extra register added to the architecture requires a further admissible
ordinal in run time to guarantee looping behaviour. One then thus arrives at the
property that any ordinal below ωckω - the first limit of admissibles, is clockable
by such an ITRM, and thence that the halting sets Hn can be computed by a
large enough device. We can state this more formally:
Thus the assertion that that these machines either halt or exhibit looping
behaviour turns out to be equivalent to a well known subsystem of second order
number theory, namely, Π1
1
-CA0. Let ITRMN be the assertion: “The N -register
halting set HN exists.” Further, let ITRM be the similar relativized statement
that “For any Z ⊆ ω, for any N < ω the N -register halting set HZN exists.”
Then more precisely:
Theorem 8 (Koepke-Welch [26])
(i) Π1
1
-CA0 ⊢ ITRM. In particular:
KP+“there exist N + 1 admissible ordinals > ω” ⊢ ITRMN .
(ii) ATR0 + ITRM ⊢ Π11-CA0.
In particular there is a fixed k < ω so that for any N < ω
ATR0 + ITRMN ·k ⊢ “HJ(N,∅) exists.”
An analysis of Post’s problem in this context is effected in [13].
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4.2 Ordinal register machines ORM’s
We mention finally here the notion studied by Koepke and Siders of Ordinal
Register Machines (ORM’s, [25]): essentially these are the devices above but
extended to have ordinal valued registers. Platek (in private correspondence)
indicated that he had originally considered his equational calculus on recur-
sive ordinals as being implementable on some kind of ordinal register machine.
Siders also had been thinking of such machines and in a series of papers with
Koepke considered the unbounded ordinal model. The resetting Liminf∗ rule
is abandoned, and natural Liminf’s are taken. Now ordinal arithmetic can be
performed. Remarkably given the paucity of resources apparently available one
has the similar theorem to that of the On-ITTM:
Theorem 9 (Koepke-Siders [25]) A set x ⊆ On is ORM-computable from a
finite set of ordinals parameters if and only if it is a member of the constructible
hierarchy.
They implement an algorithm that computes the truth predicate T ⊆ On
for L and which is ORM-computable on a 12 register machine (even remarking
that this can be reduced to 4!). From T a class of sets S can be computed which
is a model of their theory SO, which is indeed the constructible hierarchy.
5 Infinite Time Blum-Shub-Smale machines IB-
SSM
Lastly we consider the possible transfinite versions of the Blum-Shub-Smale
machines. These can be viewed as having registers R1, . . . , RN containing now
euclidean reals r1, . . . , rn ∈ R. There is a finite program or flow-chart with
instructions divided into function nodes or conditional branching nodes. We
shall assume that function nodes have the possibility of applying a rational
function computation of the registers (we test each time that we are not dividing
by zero). So far this accords with the finite BSS version. We now make the,
rather stringent, condition that at a limit stage λ if any register Ri does not
converge to a limit in the usual sense, then the whole computation is deemed
to have crashed and so be undefined. The value of Rι(λ) is then set to be the
ordinary limit of the contents of Ri(α) as α→ λ. It has been noted that a BSS
machine cannot calculate the functions ex, sinx etc., but an IBSSM can, indeed
in ω many steps (by simply calculating increasingly long initial segments of the
appropriate power series).
Koepke and Seyfferth [24] have investigated such machines with continuous
limits. To simulate other sorts of machines on an IBSSM requires some inge-
nuity: a register that is perhaps simulating a register of one of the ITRM’s
discussed earlier, may have some contents x, that tends to infinity and be then
reset. Here then it is better to calculate with 1
x
in order to ensure a continuous
limit of 0. Else if the register is simulating the contents of the scratch tape
of an ITTM, then perhaps at successor stages continual division by 2 ensures
again a continuous limit at the next limit ordinal of time. They show that a
machine with n nodes in its flow diagram can halt on rational number input at
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ordinal times without any limit below ωn+1. Thus any such machine will halt,
crash or be looping by time ωω.
The question is naturally what is the computational power of such machines?
Clearly, by absoluteness considerations, on rational input such a machine can
be run inside the constructible hierarchy, and indeed from what they showed on
ordinal lengths of computations, inside Lωω . They then naturally ask whether
any real in Lωω can be produced by an IBSSM machine?
We can answer this affirmatively below. However at the same time we
combine this with yet another characterisation. It is possible to give another
characterisation of the sets in Lωω by using the notions of Safe Recursive Set
Functions (SRSF) of Beckmann, Buss and S. Friedman [1]. They are generaliz-
ing the notion of safe recursion of Bellantoni and Cook ([2]) used to define poly-
nomial time computations. Here variables are divided into two types safe and
normal . In the notation f(~a/~b) recursion is only allowed on the safe variables
in ~b. This allows for the definition by recursion of addition and multiplication
but crucially not exponentiation. One of the aims of [1] is to have a notion of
set recursion that corresponds to ‘polynomial time’. On input an ω-string in
2N for example, one wants a computation that halts in polynomial time from
ω - the length of the input. Hence the calculation should halt by some ωn for
an n < ω. They have:
Theorem 10 ([1]) Let f be any SRSF . Then there is a ordinal polynomial qf
in variables ~α so that
rk(f(~a/~b)) ≤ maxi rk(ai) + qf ( ~rk(a)).
Thus the typing of the variables ensures that the ranks of sets computed as
outputs from an application of an SRSFunction are polynomially bounded in
the ranks of the input. Using an adaptation of Arai, such functions on finite
strings correspond to polynomial time functions in the ordinary sense. For ω-
strings we have that such computations halt by a time polynomial in ω. As
mentioned by Schindler, it is natural to define ‘polynomial time’ for ITTM’s
to be those calculations that halt by stage ωω, and a polynomial time ITTM
function to be one that, for some N < ω, terminates on all inputs by time ωN .
We thus have:
Theorem 11 The following classes of functions of the form F : (2N)k → 2N
are extensionally equivalent:
(I) Those functions computed by a continuous IBSSM machine;
(II) Those functions that are polynomial time ITTM;
(III) Those functions that are safe recursive set functions.
Proof: We take k = 1. We just sketch the ideas and the reader may fill in
the details. By Koepke-Seyfferth for any IBSSM computable function there is
N < ω so that the function is computable in less than ωN steps. We may thus
consider that computation to be performed inside LωN [x] and so potentially
simulable in polynomial time (in ωM steps, for someM) by an ITTM. However
this can be realised: a code for any Lα[x] for α ≤ ωN , x ∈ 2N, and its theory,
may be computable by an ITTM (uniformly in the input x) by time ωN+3 by
the argument of Lemma 2 of [9] (Friedman-Welch). Since we have the theory,
20
we have the digits of the final halting IBSSM-output (or otherwise the fact that
it is looping or has crashed respectively, since these are also part of the set
theoretical truths of LωN [x]). Thus (II) ⊇ (I). If F is in the class (II), then
for some N < ω, F (x) is computable within LωN [x] and by setting up the
definition of the ITTM program P computing F we may define some α such
that the output of that program P on x (i.e. F (x)) is the α’th element of 2N in
LωN [x] uniformly in x. However the set LωN [x] is SRSF-recursive from ω∪{x}
(again uniformly in x) as is a code for α. This yields the conclusion that we
may find uniformly the output of P (x) using the code for α, again as the output
of an SRSF-recursive-in-x function. This renders (II) ⊆ (III).
Finally if F is in (III), (and we shall assume that the variable x is in a
safe variable place - but actually the case where there are normal and safe
variables is handled no differently here) then there is (cf. [1], 3.5) a finite
N and a Σ1-formula ϕ(v0, v1) so that F (x) = z iff LωN [x] |= ϕ[x, z] (using
here that TC(x) = ω and thus rk(x) = ω). Indeed we may assume that z is
named by the canonical Σ1-skolem function h for, say, LωN+ω[x] as h(i, n) for
some n < ω. Putting this together we have some Σ1 ψ(v0) (in Lx˙,∈˙) so that
F (x)(k) = z(k) = 1 iff LωN+ω[x] |= ψ[k]. In short to be able to determine
such F (x) by an IBSSM it suffices to be able to compute the Σ1-truth sets for
Lα[x] for all α < ω
ω by IBSSM’s. There are a variety of ways one could do
this, but it is well known that calculating the α’th iterates of the Turing jump
relativised to x for α < ωω would suffice. To simplify notation we shall let x
also denote the set of integers in the infinite fractional expansion of the real
x. So fix a k < ω, to see that we may calculate x(β)
′
for β < ωk. One first
constructs a counter to be used in general iterative processes, using registers
C0, . . . Ck−1 say, whose contents represent the integer coefficients in the Cantor
normal form of β < ωk where we are at the β’th stage in the process. (The
counter of course must conform to the requirement that registers are continuous
at limits λ ≤ ωk. This can be devised using reciprocals and repeated division
by 2 rather than incrementation by 1 each time.) We assume this has been done
so that in particular that C0 = C1 = · · · = Ck−1 = 0 occurs first at stage ωk.
We then code the characteristic function of {m ∈ ω | m ∈ W x
(β)′
m } as 1/0’s in
the digits at the s’th-places after the decimal point of R1 where s is of the form
pk+m.p
n0+1
0 . · · · .p
nk−1+1
k−1 where p0 = 2, p1 = 3, etc., enumerates the primes,
and nj the exponent of ω
j in the Cantor Normal form of ωβ. For limit stages
λ < ωk, continuity of the register contents automatically ensures that this real
in R1 also codes the disjoint union of the x
(β)′ for β < λ, and at stage ωk we
have the whole sequence of jumps encoded as required. Q.E.D.
6 Conclusions
The avenues of generalization of the Turing machine model into the transfi-
nite which we have surveyed, give rise to differing perspectives and a wealth of
connections. Higher type recursion theory, to which the models mostly nearly
approximate, to a lesser or greater extent, was a product of Kleene’s general-
ization of the notion of an equational calculus approach to recursive functions.
Here discussed are machines more on the Turing side of the balance. Some of
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the other generalizations of recursion theory, say to meta-recursion theory, as
advocated by Kreisel and elucidated by Sacks and his school, and which later
became ordinal α-recursion theory, we have not really discussed here in great de-
tail, but again their motivations came from the recursion theoretic-side, rather
than any ‘computational-model-theoretic’ direction. The models discussed in
this chapter thus fill a gap in our thinking.
Referring to the last section, we find that, rather like a Church’s thesis,
we have here an effective system for handling ω-strings in polynomial time, as
formalized by the SRSF’s, and a natural corresponding computational model of
ITTM’s working with calculations halting by time earlier than ωω. The model
of computation with the continuous limit IBSSM’s then also computes the same
functions. Note that assertions such as that “every continuous IBSSM halts,
loops, or becomes discontinuous” when formalized in second order arithmetic,
are intermediate between ACA0 and ATR0. There is much to be said for the
IBSSM model over its finite version: we have remarked that the infinite version
calculates power series functions, such as sin, ex. With a little work one sees
also that if any differentiable function f : R −→ R is IBSSM computable, then
so is its derivative f ′.
On the other hand the class of sets that ITTM’s compute form a Spector
class, and so we can bring to bear general results about such classes on the
ITTM semi-decidable, and eventually semi-decidable classes; their strength we
saw was very strong: between Π1
2
-CA0 and Π
1
3
-CA0. Finally the On-tape version
of the ITTM, gives us a new presentation of the constructible hierarchy as laid
out by an ordinary Turing program progressing throughout On time.
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